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I. INTRODUCTION 
One outcome of the global financial crisis spurred by the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in the summer of 2007 was that it quieted the criti-
cism surrounding the growth of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).
1
 In the 
years preceding the crisis, Western politicians raised concerns that these 
state-owned investment funds could be used, in effect, as political ma-
chines underwriting any number of state interests—from bankrolling 
mercantilist industrial policies, to gaining access to natural resources, 
critical infrastructure, and new technology.
2
 Unlike the ideal private in-
vestor, who is constrained by a profit motive, SWFs were not seen as 
financial institutions pursuing purely commercial objectives and risk-
adjusted financial returns.
3
 Therefore, SWFs were viewed in a very dif-
ferent light when compared to other correspondingly large beneficiary 
institutions, such as public pension funds.
4
 As creatures of the state, 
SWFs were seen by some as a threat to liberal free-market capitalism 
with the potential to undercut the functional efficiency of markets.
5
 The 
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growing presence of SWFs—coinciding in particular with China’s rise to 
prominence in the global economy and the general unease this created 
for Western powers—was consequently an issue of national security, 
both political and economic.
6
 
This growing apprehension surrounding SWFs came to a head in 
2006 with the Dubai Ports World (DP World) controversy. Even though 
DP World—a state-owned infrastructure operator from the United Arab 
Emirates—was not an SWF in form and function, the case provided a 
potential opportunity for proponents of SWF investment, and foreign 
investment in general, to overcome the criticism and skepticism.
7
 In 
2006, DP World purchased U.K.-based ports operator Peninsular and 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), which had contracts to op-
erate a number of U.S. ports, but did not own the ports themselves.
8
 Even 
though the United States Committee on Foreign Investment authorized 
the deal in 2005, several members of the U.S. Congress, namely New 
York Senator Charles Schumer and Representative Peter T. King, raised 
concerns about the national security implications of the deal.
9
 Because 
DP World was a state-owned firm from the Middle East, DP World ar-
guably fell victim to the “war on terrorism” political rhetoric and xeno-
phobic mistrust. Not interested in the negative publicity and the prospect 
of a congressional bill to impede the transaction, DP World divested 
P&O’s U.S. ports operations.
10
 
The financial crisis ultimately caused Western governments to wel-
come SWF investment as a way to put a floor under collapsing markets 
and to provide a set of voluntary principles that would underwrite SWFs’ 
claim to legitimacy in the international community. In the autumn of 
2007, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, in conjunction with 
the International Monetary Fund, convened the International Working 
Group of SWFs (IWG) to draft a set of generally accepted principles and 
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practices.
11
 These principles are referred to as the “Santiago Princi-
ples.”
12
 The implicit objective of these twenty-four voluntary principles 
is to promote greater transparency and disclosure among the SWF com-
munity and mollify skepticism surrounding their commercial orienta-
tion.
13
 The Santiago Principles were designed to affirm the legitimacy of 
SWFs and define the discourse surrounding their global expansion as 
institutional investors in global capital markets in pursuit of risk-adjusted 
financial returns.
14
 Ultimately, the development of the Santiago Princi-
ples was a means of defining SWFs—not as creatures of mercantilist re-
alpolitik, but as benign pools of capital, like other conventional benefi-
ciary institutions (e.g., supplementary occupational pension funds), con-
tributing to the depth and efficiency of global financial markets.
15
 
Taken together, the activities of SWFs do appear to be benign. 
They may still be creatures of the state, but most appear to be chasing 
risk-adjusted returns instead of keeping with the skeptics’ preconceived 
notion of SWFs as political machines.
16
 This does not mean that SWFs 
are not being used to further economic policy goals that are ultimately in 
the interest of the state and national economy. For example, many SWFs 
from the Gulf States are actively used to further industrial development 
of their economies beyond natural resource extraction.
17
 Furthermore, the 
activities of some countries, namely China, are still a cause for concern 
in some quarters.
18
 But even in the case of China, it is not the actions of 
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the China Investment Corporation or its other sovereign funds, but rather 
the international expansion of its state-owned enterprises that draws the 
most skepticism.
19
 Notwithstanding the relatively benign conduct of 
SWFs, the Santiago Principles have not, arguably, led to increased trans-
parency. Compliance with the Santiago Principles has been slow and in-
complete.
20
 This underlines the inherent political nature of SWFs, as they 




Like any voluntary standard, compliance relies on the goodwill of 
the organization, and ultimately, the organization’s sponsor. Compliance 
is further complicated when there are varied interpretations as to the 
standard requirements. What is needed, as I argue in the remainder of 
this short essay, is an explicit treatment of transparency in its different 
forms such that SWFs, their sponsors, and external analysts have a dis-
cursive device for evaluating and communicating when and why (and 
why they think) certain nondisclosures are legitimate, or more important-
ly, when and why transparency in one domain may diminish the signifi-
cance of disclosure in other areas, thus reducing the significance of non-
disclosure in those areas. The aim, then, is to encourage dialogue, in con-
junction with the Santiago Principles, on nondisclosure as doing so leads, 
in my view, to increased transparency overall. Said slightly differently, 
dialogue on nondisclosure is, in itself, a form of transparency.   
II. ENHANCING THE TRANSPARENCY DIALOGUE 
In previous work, I, along with Ashby Monk, considered a simple 
conceptual framework to parse out different types of transparency in the 
constitution and operation of sovereign funds. In that work, we distin-
guished five areas of sovereign fund transparency: (1) political; (2) pro-
cedural; (3) policy; (4) operational; and (5) performance.
22
 This concep-
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tual framework mirrors many of the elements of the Santiago Principles. 
As such, it can be seen as an extension of the Santiago Principles, 
providing a somewhat different, and in some ways more explicit, lan-
guage for exploring transparency and non-transparency.
23
 
Our impetus for devising this conceptual framework was the 
emerging concern that public disclosure among the SWF community 
could potentially undermine long-term investment strategy. This concern 
is based on the assumption that a long-term investment strategy is likely 
to face increased criticism (primarily domestic) as a consequence of poor 
short-term market performance during periods of market volatility. Put 
simply, by disclosing performance metrics on a regular basis over the 
short run, the investment focus of the fund would potentially become 
concentrated on short-term performance to the detriment of higher long-
term investment returns.
24
 But performance is just one area of transpar-
ency. Nondisclosure in this area may be perfectly acceptable for some 
SWFs as a means of focusing the investment policy on the long term. 
The problem, however, is when arguably legitimate nondisclosure ex-
tends, purposefully or not, into nondisclosure of another area that may be 
deemed illegitimate. 
The view taken here is that transparency is increased in the aggre-
gate even if an SWF and its sponsor disclose only a rationale for main-
taining nondisclosure in certain areas.
25
 And in those areas where non-
disclosure is upheld, increased disclosure in other areas may provide 
functionally equivalent information. The persistence of nondisclosure 
among some (if not many) of the signatories of the Santiago Principles 
suggests that there is no global consensus as to what constitutes transpar-
ency in relation to the operation of an SWF.
26
 Western countries and 
multilateral organizations may attempt to coerce state sponsors of SWFs 
(who are unaccustomed to transparency in the governance of state insti-
tutions) to become more transparent, but coercion may be resisted and 
                                                 
 23. The Santiago Principles are divided into three sections: (1) legal framework, objectives, 
and coordination with macroeconomic policies; (2) institutional framework and governance struc-
ture; and (3) investment and risk management framework. See Dixon & Monk, supra note 22, at 
278. There are clear complementarities with the framework presented here, but the overlap and order 
is not complete. Overlap is most clear in the first section, which complements political transparency. 
 24. See IFSWF Members’ Experiences in the Application of the Santiago Principles, INT’L 
FORUM SOVERIGN WEALTH FUNDS, 34–37 (July 7, 2011), http://www.ifswf.org/pst/stp070 711.pdf. 
 25. Whether the framework here will work and by whom is an empirical question. Hence, the 
claim here regarding workability is only hypothetical. For a discussion on the importance of analyz-
ing the effectiveness and outcomes of transparency policies, see generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., 
FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007). 
 26. See generally BAGNALL & TRUMAN, supra note 20. 
586 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:581 
may ultimately be unsuccessful.
27
 Keep in mind, however, that with the 
Kuwait Declaration of April 6, 2009, the IWG–SWF was succeeded by 
the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), whose 
purpose is to “meet, exchange views on issues of common interest, and 
facilitate an understanding of the Santiago Principles and SWF activi-
ties.”
28
 The Santiago Principles may have been written, but the dialogue 
surrounding implementation continues. The issue of how SWFs are, or 
can be, transparent is thus an ongoing discussion. 
Table 1 (see below) provides a brief look at the objectives of each 
form of transparency and the methods used. The following subsections 
describe each area of transparency in more detail. Note that the treatment 
of these areas of transparency and the potential methods used in this es-
say are not exhaustive. Hence, I am not providing a ranking system.
29
 
The reason I have not chosen to rank funds or quantify transparency in 
each category is that transparency is a social construction—there are 
likely to be differing views as to what constitutes transparency and what 
information must be disclosed in order for an organization to be consid-
ered transparent. Furthermore, it is not clear that a relative ranking of 
SWF transparency will motivate increased transparency.
30
 Again, the aim 
of the conceptual framework is to promote dialogue on the logic and ra-
tionale of nondisclosure, while also examining whether disclosure of cer-
tain information negates the significance of information not disclosed. 
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Table 1: Framing Transparency 
 
A. Political Transparency 
Political transparency refers to the exogenous rules and regulations 
underpinning the fund’s operations. The objectives here are twofold: On 
the one hand, this form of transparency is about clarifying the objectives 
of the SWF in relation to a policy goal or set of policy goals. Such goals 
can range from saving for future generations to limiting the effects of 
Dutch disease.
32
 The primary method of disclosure is a mission statement 
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sector becomes less competitive on global markets as a consequence. The non-extractive sectors are 
furthermore under pressure as a larger proportion of economic resources flow to the extractive sec-
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and a description of the legislative foundations of the fund. A clearly de-
fined purpose is important, as it sets the basis for how an SWF should 
operate as an investment institution. An organization charged with 
providing a buffer fund in the event of fiscal distress should operate and 
invest differently from a fund that is charged with facilitating local eco-
nomic development or a fund that seeks to achieve at or above market 
returns over the long-term. If an SWF appears to diverge from its specif-
ic policy objective, there may be cause for concern for those who are 
skeptical of the SWF’s intentions. 
Political transparency, on the other hand, is about clarifying the re-
lationship vis-à-vis the SWF and the state sponsor. The method of disclo-
sure here could be a description of the institutional arrangements (formal 
or otherwise) guiding the interaction between the fund and the sponsor. 
Examples of institutional arrangements include the frequency of report-
ing and ministerial or political representation on the board. Understand-
ing these arrangements is very important for determining the intent of an 
SWF. If, for example, a state sponsor proclaims the independence of an 
SWF, yet the degrees of separation between political authority and day-
to-day investment decision making appear small, a skeptical outsider 
may have reason to suspect an underlying political motive that diverges 
from the stated policy goals of the SWF. However, this does not mean 
that in the case where an SWF is independent from the state sponsor that 
the state sponsor should be absent from setting broader investment goals 
or ensuring that the SWF abides by its mandate. 
B. Procedural Transparency 
Procedural transparency refers to how decisions are made, and by 
whom, throughout the process of achieving an SWF’s intended mission 
and policy goals. The objective here is to clarify the governance architec-
ture and the investment decision-making process. Disclosure includes 
information on how the board is chosen, arrangements regarding board 
tenure, and how authority is delegated inside and outside of the fund—
such as to the designation to an investment committee, the selection of 
external managers, or the hiring of internal staff. Understanding how the 
leadership of the fund is chosen and how authority is delegated provides 
                                                                                                             
tor. Consequently, economic growth and development is asymmetric, which may be detrimental to 
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Brit). 
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crucial insight into the intended behavior of the SWF. If, for example, 
board selection is purely a political exercise where board members are 
selected based on political relationships and not domain-specific exper-
tise, it is difficult for the state sponsor and the SWF to claim independ-
ence from political meddling, even if such interference is nonexistent. 
Again, this does not mean that state representatives cannot be members 
of the board; however, if a board lacks members with independent au-
thority and domain-specific expertise, the skeptical outsider may be more 
likely to infer that the SWF has political intentions. 
Likewise, where assets are not managed in-house, disclosing how 
the SWF selects external managers provides valuable information. The 
delegation of external mandates through a competitive and transparent 
bid process goes a long way in revealing whether an SWF has political or 
purely financial motivations. This logic holds equally where in-house 
management is preferred. A board and a sponsor concerned with limiting 
any semblance of political meddling would likely grant significant inde-
pendence to internal asset managers and investment committees in the 
day-to-day operation of the SWF and the selection of specific invest-
ments. 
C. Policy Transparency 
Policy transparency refers to the rules and objectives that the fund 
imposes on its own operations and personnel in implementing invest-
ments. The objective of this form of transparency is to provide clarifica-
tion regarding an SWF’s investment beliefs and guiding principles.
33
 
Knowledge regarding investment beliefs provides valuable information 
on an SWF’s intent. If a statement of investment beliefs is grounded in 
Modern Portfolio Theory
34
 and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis,
35
 
which would suggest that the SWF follows a passive investment strate-
                                                 
 33. There is a growing interest in defining and disclosing investment beliefs among some of 
the largest public and multiemployer pension funds. For discussions, see generally KEES KOEDIJK & 
ALFRED SLAGER, INVESTMENT BELIEFS: A POSITIVE APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 
(2011) (U.K.); KEITH P. AMBACHTSHEER, PENSION REVOLUTION: A SOLUTION TO THE PENSIONS 
CRISIS (2007). 
 34. MPT is theory of asset allocation whereby it is possible to maximize the expected return of 
the portfolio given a certain amount of portfolio risk. The aim is to select a set of assets that collec-
tively has a lower level of risk than any individual asset. See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio 
Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). 
 35. According to EMH, financial markets are informationally efficient. Consequently, it is 
impossible to consistently achieve risk-adjusted returns in excess of the market. See generally 
Eugune F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 
(1970). 
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36
 and holds a diversified portfolio, but the SWF is seen to be making 
large investments in a small selection of firms, skeptics are likely to see 
reasons for concern. But, if an SWF’s investment beliefs go against con-
vention, preferring instead smaller and more targeted investments that 
can be monitored more easily, the SWF’s behavior would not be out of 
the ordinary. 
For an SWF and sponsor not accustomed to complete transparency, 
a detailed set of investment beliefs—one that provides information on 
how the SWF views investment opportunities and the SWF’s geographic 
distribution—provides an external analyst important information that can 
be cross-referenced with other available information. For example, if 
information regarding investments is revealed that diverges from the 
stated investment beliefs, some may assume that the SWF has alternative 
intentions as an SWF is unlikely to keep evidence of a large deal undis-
closed indefinitely. 
In this area of transparency, an SWF may also provide information 
regarding the circumstances under which the SWF will engage its in-
vestment entities. Some SWFs may view corporate engagement as best 
left to others, choosing instead to simply exit the investment. This is the 
most likely case for SWFs concerned with the political ramifications of 
corporate engagement (particularly of foreign firms), as it could easily be 
labeled as political intervention by a foreign government. For other 
SWFs, particularly those that can demonstrate the extent of the SWF’s 
independence from direct political influence, corporate engagement may 
be a crucial part of its investment beliefs.
37
 An argument can be made 
that ownership entails certain rights and responsibilities. Exercising 




                                                 
 36. In contrast to active management where investors try to beat the market through stock 
selection, the passive investor focuses on achieving risk-adjusted market returns at the lowest possi-
ble costs, usually by constructing a portfolio that tracks an externally specified index (e.g., S&P 
500). See generally JOHN Y. CAMPBELL & LUIS M. VICEIRA, STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION: 
PORTFOLIO CHOICE FOR LONG-TERM INVESTORS (2002). 
 37. For example, Norges Bank Investment Management, the organization charged with manag-
ing Norway’s SWF Government Pension Fund-Global, has begun to increasingly engage the leader-
ship of the companies it invests in. This is seen as one of its long-term fiduciary responsibilities, 
given that on average it owns 2.5% of the companies in which it invests. See Richard Milne, Norway 
Wealth Fund Focuses On Corporate Engagement, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013. 
 38. See generally STEPHEN DAVIS ET AL., THE NEW CAPITALISTS: HOW CITIZEN INVESTORS 
ARE RESHAPING THE CORPORATE AGENDA (2006); TESSA HEBB, NO SMALL CHANGE: PENSION 
FUNDS AND CORPORATE ENGAGEMENT (2008); Gordon L. Clark & Tessa Hebb, Pension Fund Cor-
porate Engagement: The Fifth Stage of Capitalism, 59 REL. INDUSTRIELLES/INDUS. REL. 142 (2004) 
(Can.); see also JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM 
DECISION-MAKING (2012), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/1 
2-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf. 
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D. Operational Transparency 
Operational transparency refers to the way the investment strategy, 
underpinned by investment beliefs, is implemented and by whom. The 
objective here is to describe the ways in which the fund seeks to put poli-
cies into action, such as how the fund plans to access financial markets, 
certain industries, and geographies. The most transparent method for dis-
closure is regular and detailed provision of information on asset alloca-
tion, specific investments, and intended holding periods. Ultimately, op-
erational transparency is about clarifying what an SWF is actually doing. 
For some SWFs, provision of such details may not be forthcoming. For 
others, it may be forthcoming, but not on a regular basis for fear of un-
dermining a particular investment or investment strategy.
39
 This may, 
however, foster skepticism. Although not a perfect substitute, an SWF 
may instead provide detailed information about the managers that have 
been selected, the scope of their investment mandates, and the ongoing 
monitoring of these investment relationships. It may also provide infor-
mation on how internal teams have been constructed. This can be seen as 
providing somewhat of a proxy for asset allocation. Finally, where an 
SWF participates in corporate engagement, operational transparency en-
tails disclosure of such actions and the reasons for those actions, if that 
action has not already been publicized, as is likely to be the case. 
E. Performance Transparency 
Performance transparency refers to the investment outcomes 
achieved by the fund. The objective of this form of transparency is to 
shed light on whether an SWF is performing as designed, but more im-
portantly, whether it is in keeping with its mission. While poor perfor-
mance may point to an ineffective, inexperienced, and ill-resourced or-
ganization (among other potential problems), it may also point to in-
vestments made for political purposes or an organization that is subject 
to excessive political interference in its day-to-day operations.
40
 Perfor-
mance-exceeding market returns may also be an indicator of impropriety. 
However, an SWF that discloses a best-practice governance architecture, 
its investment beliefs, procedures for monitoring investment relation-
ships, and how it maintains and motivates an expert staff, among other 
areas of disclosure discussed above, can more easily justify above aver-
age performance. 
                                                 
 39. For example, if an SWF indicated its intended holding period for specific investments, 
other investors in the market may trade on that information and therefore undermine the SWF’s 
expected returns from the investment. 
 40. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799–839 (1993). 
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The most obvious method for disclosing performance is providing 
information on returns set against some market benchmark, or absolute 
returns. The issue, however, is the frequency of such disclosure. For 
long-term investors, monthly and quarterly returns may seem inappropri-
ate. Markets can be highly volatile in the short run, which can exaggerate 
good or bad performance. For an SWF trying to maintain a long-term 
investment strategy, poor performance in the short run, while possibly 
pointing to an ill-resourced and ill-managed organization, may give the 
organization’s sponsors or its detractors reason to intervene in the SWF’s 
operations. Such intervention may jeopardize the long-term strategy, or 
the threat of potential intervention could force the organization to have 
an overly short-term focus. 
For a number of commentators, SWF officials, and SWF sponsors, 
the demand for short-term performance metrics is arguably the cause of 
so much short-termism in financial markets.
41
 Hence, many SWFs 
choose not to produce performance metrics on a regular basis, if they 
produce them at all. For example, since 2010, the Singapore Government 
Investment Corporation has disclosed its real returns on five-year, ten-
year, and twenty-year bases while producing increased information on its 
governance, investment policies, and operations.
42
 This contrasts with the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF), which produces monthly 
performance metrics.
43
 The NZSF combines this regular disclosure with 
active public engagement, going to great lengths to educate the public on 
how markets, particularly equity markets, are volatile in the short run, yet 
mean reverting over the long run.
44
 
The case of the NZSF is compelling as it demonstrates that produc-
ing quantitative performance metrics is insufficient as a whole; an organ-
ization needs to provide further justification of its performance as a 
                                                 
 41. For a general discussion on short-termism, see generally David Marginson & Laurie 
McAulay, Exploring the Debate on Short-Termism: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 29 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 273 (2008); Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance 
Obsession, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 65 (2005). 
 42. See GOV’T OF SING. INV. CORP. PTE LTD, GIC REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 
GOVERNMENT’S PORTFOLIO FOR THE YEAR 2010/11, at 8 (2011), available at http://www.gic.com.s 
g/images/pdf/GIC_Report_2011.pdf. 
 43. See generally N.Z. SUPERANNUATION FUND, HOW WE INVEST (2012), available at 
http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/files/How%20We%20Invest.pdf. 
 44. See Dixon & Monk, supra note 22. For more detailed accounts of Singapore’s sovereign 
wealth funds, see generally CLARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 86–104; Henry Wai-chung Yeung, 
From National Development to Economic Diplomacy? Governing Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, 24 PAC. REV. 625 (2011). For further discussion on the governance of the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund, see Benjamin J. Richardson, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Quest for 
Sustainability: Insights from Norway and New Zealand, NORDIC J. COM. L, 2/2011 at 1, 
http://www.njcl.utu.fi/2_2011/benjamin_j_richardson.pdf (Fin.). 
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means of ensuring its legitimacy with the public.
45
 Hence, other methods 
of performance disclosure can come through internal and external audits 
that may examine subjective criteria. These subjective reports could ex-
amine, for example, whether there is a self-reflexive learning culture 
within the organization and the board. Producing such performance re-
ports is ultimately about reflecting the image of a professional financial 
institution, which is focused on achieving some risk-adjusted return in 
the pursuit of a legitimate policy goal established by the sponsor. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Often underlying Western society’s concern with the rise of SWFs, 
or for that matter, any accumulation of financial power by some public 
entity (e.g., a public-employee pension fund or a state-owned enterprise), 
is the intrinsic link these entities have with the state. There is a percep-
tion that this link is incompatible with free-market capitalism. If not al-
ways an explicit argument, skeptics fear that such state-sponsored enti-
ties, even if there is a high degree of organizational and political separa-
tion from the decision makers of these entities, will ultimately contra-
vene “free” market process of exchange to the benefit of the political 
will. In a space that purportedly should be limited to only private actors, 
this interference is ultimately inefficient. By this logic, such entities con-
travene the “spirit of capitalism” and are thus seen as threatening. 
Unfortunately, skeptics seem to forget or ignore that markets are 
inherently political: Throughout the history of capitalism and over the 
last 150 years, the state has had a key role in ensuring capitalist process-
es—whether explicitly or implicitly.
46
 The state sets many of the “rules 
of the game” through regulation and is usually there to provide public 
goods to the economy that are necessary for the rest of the capitalist sys-
tem to operate. No successful developed market economy is without a 
relatively strong state and strong institutions.
47
 The global financial crisis 
of the last decade reminded us that even in the most so-called free mar-
kets, the state is always waiting in the shadows to rescue capitalism from 
its excesses and failures. The state is likely to continue to do so, even to 
the chagrin of free-market purists, because it has always done so. Most 
                                                 
 45. See generally Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Ap-
proaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571 (1995). 
 46. See generally IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, HISTORICAL CAPITALISM (1983). 
 47. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE 
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012).  
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political leaders are unwilling to sit back and see what happens if action 
is not taken, even if the moral hazard is clear.
48
 
Following the global financial collapse in September 2008, it was 
not uncommon to hear fearful pronouncements that capitalism could 
soon be replaced—that emerging markets that had embraced capitalism 
as a means to organize their economies over the last several decades 
would revert to their old ways. The specter of socialism was knocking on 
the door, or was it? Like most crises, many forget to remind themselves 
that capitalism has always oscillated between booms and busts (to vary-
ing degrees). However, this fear was not so much a fear of a return to 
socialism, but a fear of a return of the interventionist state and a state that 
controls the means of production.
49
 Yet, if one is reminded that the state 
is a part of the process, even in the freest of markets, then a more visible 
state is not necessarily counterproductive to a properly functioning free 
market, or the continuing existence of one. The state may have to period-
ically show its face, but it is still firmly on the side of capitalism in al-
most all countries. That the majority of SWFs are in emerging markets is 
not just a product of global imbalances and high commodity prices over 
the last decade—it demonstrates the way that market capitalism has been 
embraced since the end of colonial rule and the collapse of the Iron Cur-
tain. Since the crisis began, more and more countries have established or 
are in the process of establishing their own sovereign wealth funds.
50
 
Given that SWFs are by nature capitalist entities in pursuit of the profits 
of global capitalism, this development is further confirmation of market 
capitalism as a form of economic organization with states (not surpris-
ingly) as leading supporters. 
But, states are not all the same. States and their polities do not al-
ways share the same values or have the same political traditions—
openness and transparency included. This is not, however, a state of af-
fairs that is unchangeable. Economic and political globalization brings 
ideas and different traditions into contact, often engendering change in 
the process. Hence, sponsors of SWFs may not all agree on what consti-
tutes transparency. This is clearly apparent given the arguably measured 
compliance with the Santiago Principles. Nonetheless, the appetite for 
and commitment to dialogue on transparency and other general issues 
related to sponsoring an SWF, fostered through the IFSWF, is clearly 
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palpable. While not seeking to replace the Santiago Principles, the simple 
conceptual framework offered in this essay is a response and contribution 
to that commitment. 
Assuming that some SWFs and their state sponsors will remain 
wedded to nondisclosure in certain areas, it does not mean that they will 
necessarily maintain nondisclosure in other areas, which may provide a 
partial substitute for certain nondisclosures. Complete transparency may 
be wanting for some, but in the aggregate, transparency is increased if 
dialogue on non-transparency and potential functional equivalencies is 
expanded. Again, the framework provided here is for discursive purpos-
es, which may be used by SWFs, their sponsors, and external analysts in 
describing the intentions of an SWF and ultimately those of the sponsor. 
